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DONALD K. ANTON & DINAH SHELTON, 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS  
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011) 
 
 
A Human Right to a Healthy Environment Case Study 
 
I.  International Guarantees 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (26 June 1981), Article 24 provides that “All 
peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development.” 
The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (17 Nov. 1988), Article 11, proclaims:  
1.  Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic 
public services.  
2.  The States Parties shall promote the protection, preservation and improvement of the 
environment.   
However, the Protocol only permits complaints to be filed alleging violations of the right to education 
and the right to trade union freedoms.  This creates difficulties for invoking Protocol Article 11 
directly before the Inter-American institutions. 
 
 The African system has few limits on justiciability and provides very broad standing to file 
complaints.  The first decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
concerning environmental quality arose from Communications 25/89, 47/90, 56/91 and 100/93 
against Zaire, summarized infra.  Later, the Commission received the much larger case centering 
on oil exploration and exploitation in the Niger River Delta.  What does it suggest about the 
content of the right to environment and the corresponding state duties?  For commentaries on the 
case and the Ogoni conflict generally, see Fons Coomans, The Ogoni Case Before the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 749 (2003); Joshua P. 
Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations, and the 
Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT’L L.J. 261, 293 (1997). 
 
 
II. National Guarantees of the Right to a Safe and Healthy Environment 
 
Some 130 constitutions in the world, including the overwhelming proportion of those amended or 
written since 1970, include a state obligation to protect the environment or a right to a safe, healthy, 
ecologically-balanced (or other adjective) environment.  About half the constitutions take the rights-
based approach and the other half proclaim state duties.  This section looks at environmental rights in 
Europe, the United States, and South Africa. 
 
European Environmental Human Rights and Environmental Rights: A Long Time Coming? 
Ole Pedersen 
21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL.L.REV. 73, 108-111 (2008)(footnotes renumbered) 
 
Although the approach to a substantive right to the environment is perhaps one of caution on 
a regional level in Europe, a number of national constitutions recognize rights to a healthy 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1872937
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environment. These constitutional provisions, while effective only on a national level, indicate that the 
issue is one of increasing importance throughout Europe.1
For instance, the French Constitution was amended in 2005 and now includes a Charter of the 
Environment (“Charter”).2 The Charter affords all citizens of France the right to live in a “balanced 
environment, favorable to human health.”3 The Charter has been relied upon by the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel in reviewing the constitutionality of ordinary bills. For instance, in a case from 2005 
dealing with the establishment of a maritime register the Conseil Constitutionnel relied on the Charter 
although it did not find that the proposed bill violated the Charter’s provisions.4 The Charter was also 
relied upon by a local administrative court in 2005 when it suspended the granting of an 
administrative permission to host a rave party in a former airfield, which had subsequently been listed 
under domestic nature conservation law.5 Here, the court found that the Charter constituted a 
“fundamental freedom” of constitutional value allowing for the suspension of the administrative 
permission under French procedural law.6
The French amendment serves to increase the number of European constitutions facilitating a 
human right to the environment. For example: the Constitution of Belgium, where the right to “lead a 
worthy life of human dignity” includes “the right to protection of a sound environment”;7 Portugal 
where the Constitution asserts that “all have the right to a healthy ecologically balanced human 
environment and the duty to defend it”;8 and Spain where the Constitution states that “everyone has 
the right to enjoy an environment suitable for the development of the person as well as the duty to 
preserve it.”9 Further north, the Finnish Constitution, adopted in 2000, states that the “public 
                                                 
1  Apart from providing for a specific right, some constitutions contain general provisions on the environment in 
the shape of broad policy statements. See, e.g., STATUUT NED [Constitution] ch. I, art. 21 (Neth.), translated in 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Rainer Grote eds., Nov. 2005) (stating 
“it shall be the concern of the authorities to keep the country habitable and to protect and improve the 
environment”).  
 
2 Legifrance, Charter for the Environment, art. 1, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/constitution/const03.htm; 
see, e.g., David Marrani, The Second Anniversary of the Constitutionalisation of the French Charter for the 
Environment: Constitutional and Environmental Implications, 10 ENV. L. REV. 9 (2008); James R. May, 
Constituting Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 113, 113-14 (2005-2006).  
 
3 [Legifrance, Id.] 
 
4  See CC decision no. 2005-514DC, Apr. 28, 2005, R. 305 (Loi relative à la création du registre international 
français); Marrani, supra note [33]. 
 
5  See Marrani, supra note [33], at 21-22. 
 
6  Id. 
 
7  LA CONSTITUTION BELGE art. 23(3)(4) (Belg.), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD, supra note [32]; see also Marc Martens, Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment in Belgium, 16 
REV. EUR. CMTY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 287 (2007) (noting that the right in Article 23 amounts to a so-called 
standstill obligation upon the state). 
 
8  CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [Constitution] art. 66 (Port.), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF 
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note [32]. 
 
9  C.E. [Constitution] art. 45 (Spain), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra 
note [32]. However, the right enshrined in the Spanish Constitution has been called into question as it has been 
argued that it serves more as a policy principle. See Ernst Brandl & Hartwin Bungert, Constitutional 
Entrenchment of Environmental Protection: A Comparative Analysis of Experiences Abroad, 16 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1, 61-63 (1992); Douglas-Scott, supra note 202, at 110-11. 
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authorities shall endeavor to guarantee for everyone the right to a healthy environment.”10 Likewise, 
the Norwegian Constitution, altered in 1992, contains a right to “an environment that is conducive to 
health.”11 In addition, a great number of Eastern European countries have, following the breakdown 
of the Soviet Union, altered or changed their constitutions to include a substantive right to the 
environment.12
. . . 
Thus, the vast number of national constitutions holding provisions on substantive as well as 
procedural environmental rights adds further impetus to the use of rights to provide for environmental 
protections. As for the substantive norms, the rights in the national constitutions have the potential to 
influence debates on the status of a substantive environmental norm under international law. Here it is 
worth recalling Taúkin v. Turkey, where the plaintiff relied on the right to a healthy environment in the 
Turkish Constitution before the court, which found this to constitute a civil right within the meaning 
of the ECHR.  National constitutional environmental rights are strong indicators of national opinio 
juris and represent the highest level of national law operating as a lex suprema. In addition, many of 
the constitutions changed throughout the last twenty years have been amended to specifically 
accommodate these rights. 
_______ 
 
A. The United States 
The United States federal constitution is not one of those that mention the environment – 
unsurprising given that the constitution was drafted in 1789 – and rights are not often implied as a 
result of litigation.  Nonetheless, in 1968, the same year the government of Sweden proposed to the 
United Nations that it convene its first international conference on the human environment, U.S. 
Senator Gaylord Nelson introduced a draft constitutional amendment that would have recognized in 
the Bill of Rights that “[e]very person has the inalienable right to a decent environment.” H.R. J. Res. 
1321, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).  The proposal failed, as did later attempts to recognize such a right. 
H.R. J. Res. 1205, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).  Most recently, Representative Jesse Jackson, Jr. 
proposed a constitutional amendment “respecting the right to a clean, safe, and sustainable 
environment.” H.R.J. Res. 33, 108th Cong. (2003). Each of these proposals sought not only to elevate 
environmental protection to a Constitutional right, but also to give the federal government a clear 
mandate to regulate environmental matters.  Without such a mandate, the government has had to rely 
on the commerce clause or other enumerated powers in order to assert jurisdiction over natural 
resources. Thus, the federal government may protect migratory birds that cross state lines, but lacks 
jurisdiction to protect all the habitats of such birds, because these habitats include state and private 
lands and non-navigable waters. State opposition to granting this power to the federal government 
may explain the failure of the proposed amendments.  
                                                 
10  SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [Constitution] art. 20 (Fin.), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD, supra note [32]. Article 20 stems from a constitutional reform taking place in the mid 1990s in Finland 
aiming at providing a more “coherent set of fundamental rights” in Finland. See Stephen Davies, In Name or 
Nature? Implementing International Environmental Procedural Rights in the Post-Aarhus Environment: A 
Finnish Example, 9 ENV. L. REV. 190 (2007). 
 
11  GRUNNLOV [Constitution] art. 110B (Nor.), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, 
supra note [32]. 
 
12  These include among others: Albania, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, 
Russia, Slovenia and Ukraine; See May, supra note 218, at 129-31. For example, the Hungarian Constitution 
states, “Hungary recognizes and implements everyone’s right to a healthy environment.” A MAGYAR 
KÜZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [Constitution] art. 18 (Hung.), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES 
OF THE WORLD, supra note [32]; see also Gyula Badni, The Right to Environment in Theory and Practice: The 
Hungarian Experience, 8 CONN. J. INT’L L. 439 (1993). 
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States in the U.S. have the power to provide their citizens with rights additional to those 
contained in the federal constitution, and state constitutions revised or amended from 1970 to the 
present have added environmental protection among their provisions.  See  Ala. Const. art. VIII; Cal. 
Const. art. X, § 2; Fla. Const. art. II, § 7; Haw. Const. art. XI; Ill. Const. art. XI; La. Const. art. IX; 
Mass. Const. § 179; Mich. Const. art. IV, § 52; Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1; N.M. Const. art. XX, § 21; 
N.Y. Const. art. XIV; N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 5; Ohio Const. art. II, § 36; Pa. Const. art. I, § 27; R.I. 
Const. art. 1, § 17; Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 59; Utah Const. art. XVIII; Va. Const. art. XI, § 1.  For 
discussions of these provisions, see: A. E. Dick Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 
VA. L. REV. 193, 229 (1972); Roland M. Frye, Jr., Environmental Provisions in State Constitutions, 5 
ENVTL. L. REP. 50028-29 (1975); Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions, Land Use, and Public 
Resources: The Gift Outright, 1984 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 13, 28-29; Robert A. McLaren, Comment, 
Environmental Protection Based on State Constitutional Law: A Call for Reinterpretation, 12 U. 
Haw. L. REV. 123, 126-27 (1990).; Carole L. Gallagher, The Movement to Create an Environmental 
Bill of Rights: From Earth Day 1970 to the Present, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 107 (1997).  For a 
listing of all environmental provisions in state constitutions, see Bret Adams et al., Environmental and 
Natural Resources Provisions in State Constitutions, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 73 (2002).  
The authors take a broad reading of the topic, including all provisions that touch on natural resources.  
They come to a total of 207 state constitutional provisions in 46 state constitutions.   
The first constitutional recognition of environmental rights appeared in Pennsylvania.  Two 
years after the initial federal constitution effort failed, April 14, 1970 was designated the first Earth 
Day. See Matthew Thor Kirsch, Upholding the Public Trust in State Constitutions, 46 DUKE L.J. 1169-
1210 (1997).  To mark the occasion, the Pennsylvania legislature approved a proposed amendment to 
the state constitution.  The author of the proposal said he intended to “give our natural environment 
the same kind of constitutional protection that [is] given our political rights.” Franklin L. Kury, The 
Pennsylvania Environmental Protection Amendment, PA. B. ASS’N Q., Apr. 1987, at 85, 87, quoted in 
Kirsch, supra n. 30 at 1170. The proposed amendment was approved overwhelmingly by voters in the 
state, on May, 18, 1971. The vote was more than 3 -1 in favor of the amendment, with close to 2 
million voters.  See Franklin L. Kury, The Environmental Amendment to the Pennsylvania 
Constitution: Twenty Years Later and Largely Untested, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 123-24 (1990).   The 
provision, now Article I, section 27 of the state constitution, sets forth: 
 
Section 27.  Natural resources and the public estate 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the 
natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the environment.  Pennsylvania’s 
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including 
generations yet to come.  As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall 
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people. 
There are several evident features about this text.  First, it declares the “people’s” right to 
environmental amenities with a directive to the state to act as a trustee for the “public natural 
resources” of the state (excluding private property).  The resources mentioned are declared to be 
common property and held for future as well as present generations.   
 Following this example, more than thirty of the fifty states in the United States (60%) have 
added constitutional provisions that refer to environmental or natural resource protection as a state 
constitutional right or governmental duty.  The intent of the provisions must be considered in the 
context of the federal system: unlike the federal government, which must act within the scope of 
conferred powers, state authorities may act unless prohibited from doing so.  Thus, they may regulate 
the activities harming the environment without mention of the topic in the state constitution.  
Including provisions in the constitution must serve some other purpose than simply conferring 
legislative authority over environmental matters.  The most compelling explanation is that the 
amendments were intended to elevate environmental protection as a fundamental value to a 
constitutional status above the states’ legislative and regulatory norms.  Another purpose appears in 
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some state debates and constitutional texts: to expand standing to sue to allow public interest 
litigation on behalf of the environment. 
 A half dozen other states, like Hawaii, Illinois, Montana, and Texas followed Pennsylvania in 
adding a constitutional right to environment.  Hawaii’s Constitution, Article XI, section 9, reads: 
Each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by law 
relating to environmental quality, including control of pollution and resources.  Any 
person may enforce this right against any party, public or private, through appropriate 
legal proceedings. 
 Illinois, Massachusetts and Montana all amended their constitutions in 1972 to similarly 
provide for a right to a clean and healthful environment.  Massachusetts expressly guarantees the 
right to clean air and water, freedom from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural scenic, 
historic, and aesthetic qualities of their environment.  Mass. Const. art. XLIX.  Montana’s amendment 
provides:  The people shall have the right to clean air and water, freedom from excessive and 
unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic qualities of their environment; and 
the protection of the people in their right to the conservation development and utilization of the 
agricultural, mineral, forest, water, air and other natural resources is hereby declared to be a public 
purpose.  Mont. Const. XLIX.  This provision has been enforced by the courts, as the following case 
illustrates. 
  
Montana Environmental Information Center et al v. 
Department of Environmental Quality 
296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236 (1999) 
 
Justice TERRY N. TRIEWEILER delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
¶ 1  The Plaintiffs, Montana Environmental Information Center (MEIC), Clark Fork-Pend 
Oreille Coalition, and Women's Voices for the Earth, filed an amended complaint in the District Court 
for the First Judicial District in Lewis and Clark County in which the Department of Environmental 
Quality (DEQ) for the State of Montana was named as the Defendant and in which Seven-Up Pete 
Joint Venture (SPJV) subsequently intervened. Plaintiffs alleged, among other claims, that to the 
extent § 75-5-317(2)(j), MCA (1995) allows discharges of water from watering well or monitoring 
well tests, which degrade high quality waters without review pursuant to Montana's nondegradation 
policy found at § 75-5-303(3), MCA (1995), that statute is void for a violation of Article IX, Section 
1(1) and (3) of the Montana Constitution. Plaintiffs sought an injunction suspending the exploration 
license that had been issued by DEQ to SPJV for pump tests to be performed at the site of its proposed 
gold mine. Both parties moved for summary judgment and following the submission of affidavits and 
oral testimony, the District Court held that absent a finding of actual injury, § 75-5-317(2)(j), MCA 
(1995) was not unconstitutional as applied and entered judgment for the DEQ. The Plaintiffs appeal 
from the judgment of the District Court. We reverse and remand for further review consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
¶ 2  The issue on appeal is whether the Plaintiffs have demonstrated standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of § 75-5-317(2)(j), MCA (1995), and, if so, whether the statute implicates either 
Article II, Section 3 or Article IX, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution. 
. . . 
Standing 
 ¶ 41 In Gryczan v. State (1997), 283 Mont. 433, 442-43, 942 P.2d 112, 118, we held that the 
following criteria must be satisfied to establish standing:(1) the complaining party must clearly allege 
past, present, or threatened injury to a property or civil right; and (2) the alleged injury must be 
distinguishable from the injury to the public generally, but the injury need not be exclusive to the 
complaining party. 
 ¶ 42 In Missoula City-County Air Pollution Control Board v. Board of Environmental Review 
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(1997), 282 Mont. 255, 937 P.2d 463, this Court considered the first prong of the two-part test and 
concluded that a threatened injury to the Local Board had been established by demonstrating 
“potential economic injury.”  Missoula City-County Air Pollution Control Bd., 282 Mont. at 262-63, 
937 P.2d at 468. The court accepted the Local Board's argument that “it face[d] potential economic 
harm from the additional expenses necessary to monitor, collect and analyze data, and to develop a 
regulatory response which will ensure that Missoula air quality meets minimum federal standards in 
the face of increased air pollution from Stone Container.”  Missoula City-County Air Pollution 
Control Bd., 282 Mont. at 262, 937 P.2d at 468. 
 ¶ 43 The second prong of the test for standing requires that the litigant distinguish his or her 
injury from injury to the general public.   Gryczan, 283 Mont. at 442, 942 P.2d at 118. However, the 
injury need not be exclusive to the litigant.   Gryczan, 283 Mont. at 443, 942 P.2d at 118. In Gryczan 
we held that the plaintiffs had satisfied the second prong because they “presented evidence of specific 
psychological effects caused by the statute.”  We further found it significant that “to deny 
Respondents standing would effectively immunize the statute from constitutional review.”  Gryczan, 
283 Mont. at 446, 942 P.2d at 120. 
 ¶ 44 In Missoula City-County Air Pollution Control Board we held that the Local Board's 
“interest in the effective discharge of the obligations imposed upon it by law is the equivalent of the 
personal stake which would support standing of a private citizen of the Missoula airshed.”    Missoula 
City-County Air Pollution Control Bd., 282 Mont. at 262, 937 P.2d at 467. We further stated that: 
It is clear to this Court that a citizen of Missoula, as one who breathes the air into which Stone 
Container is expelling pollutants, would have standing to bring this action....  In the same way 
as a citizen of the Missoula airshed is more particularly affected by the State Board's acts than 
is a citizen of another area, the interest of the Local Board is distinguishable from and greater 
than the interest of the public generally. 
Missoula City-County Air Pollution Control Bd., 282 Mont. at 262, 937 P.2d at 467-68. 
 ¶ 45 Based on these criteria, we conclude that the allegations in the Plaintiffs' complaint 
which are uncontroverted, established their standing to challenge conduct which has an arguably 
adverse impact on the area in the headwaters of the Blackfoot River in which they fish and otherwise 
recreate, and which is a source for the water which many of them consume. Whether Plaintiffs have 
demonstrated sufficient harm from the statute and activity complained of to implicate their 
constitutional rights and require strict scrutiny of the statute they have challenged, is a separate issue. 
 
Constitutional and Statutory Framework 
 ¶ 46 Appellants contend that § 75-5-317(2)(j), MCA (1995), violates their rights guaranteed 
by Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution. 
 ¶ 47 Article II, Section 3 provides in relevant part that: 
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean 
and healthful environment.... 
     Mont. Const. art. II, § 3. 
 ¶ 48 Article IX, Section 1 provides in relevant part as follows: 
 (1)  The State and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful 
environment in Montana for present and future generations. 
. . . 
 (3)  The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the 
environmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent 
unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
      Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 ¶ 49 Although enacted prior to the constitutional provisions relied on, the Plaintiffs contend 
that the nondegradation policy for high quality waters established by § 75-5-303, MCA, of Montana's 
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Water Quality Act is reasonably well designed to meet the constitution's objectives and that it is the 
minimum requirement which must be satisfied for a discharge which degrades the existing quality of 
Montana water. . . . 
 ¶ 50  Plaintiffs contend that the Constitution's environmental protections were violated y the 
legislature in 1995, when it amended § 75-5-317(2)(j), MCA to provide a blanket exception to the 
requirements of nondegradation review for discharges from water well or monitoring well tests 
without regard to the harm caused by those tests or the degrading effect that the discharges have on 
the surrounding or recipient environment.   Section 75-5-317(2)(j), MCA (1995), provides in relevant 
part as follows: 
 (1) The categories or classes of activities identified in subsection (2) cause changes in 
water quality that are nonsignificant because of their low potential for harm to human health 
or the environment and their conformance with the guidance found in 75-5-301(5)(c). 
 (2) The following categories or classes of activities are not subject to the provisions 
of 75-5-303: 
. . . 
 (j) discharges of water from water well or monitoring well tests . . . 
conducted in accordance with department approved water quality protection practices. 
. . . 
 ¶ 51 Plaintiffs contend that the groundwater discharged into the alluvia of the Landers Fork 
and Blackfoot Rivers and ultimately to the alluvial aquifers and the surface water of at least the 
Landers Fork River, degraded high quality waters by definition as established by the Department or its 
predecessor through A.R.M. 17.30.715(1)(b), which provides as follows: 
 (1)  The following criteria will be used to determine whether certain activities or 
classes of activities will result in nonsignificant changes in existing water quality due to their 
low potential to affect human health or the environment. These criteria consider the quantity 
and strength of the pollutant, the length of time the changes will occur, and the character of 
the pollutant. Except as provided in (2) of this rule, changes in existing surface or 
groundwater quality resulting from the activities that meet all the criteria listed below are 
nonsignificant, and are not required to undergo review under 75-5-303, MCA: 
. . . 
 (b) discharges containing carcinogenic parameters . . . at concentrations less 
than or equal to the concentrations of those parameters in the receiving water. . . . 
 ¶ 52 Because discharges containing carcinogenic parameters, (i.e., discharged water 
containing concentrations of arsenic equal to .009 mg/l) greater than those in the receiving water (i.e., 
.003 mg/l) were allowed in this case, Plaintiffs contend that the discharges should not have been 
exempt from nondegradation review by DEQ's own standards and that they have, therefore, 
demonstrated the necessary harm for strict scrutiny of the blanket exemption provided for in § 75-5-
317(2)(j), MCA. 
. . . 
Constitutional Analysis 
 ¶ 54 In order to address the issue raised on appeal, it is necessary that we determine the 
threshold showing which implicates the rights provided for by Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, 
Section 1 of the Montana Constitution and the level of scrutiny to be applied to each provision. DEQ 
and SPJV contend, and the District Court agreed that actual danger to human health or the health of 
the environment must first be demonstrated. The Plaintiffs contend that Montana's constitutional 
provisions are intended to prevent harm to the environment; that degradation to the environment is all 
that need be shown; and that degradation was established in this case based on the DEQ's own 
adopted standard. 
 ¶ 55 We have not had prior occasion to discuss the level of scrutiny which applies when the 
right to a clean and healthful environment guaranteed by Article II, Section 3 or those rights referred 
to in Article IX, Section 1 are implicated. Nor have we previously discussed the showing which must 
Anton & Shelton                        HUMAN RIGHTS & ENVIRONMENT  CASE STUDIES                                            Page   8 
 
necessarily be made to establish that rights guaranteed by those two constitutional provisions are 
implicated. However, our prior cases which discuss other provisions of the Montana Constitution and 
the debate of those delegates who attended the 1972 Constitutional Convention, guide us in both 
respects. 
 In Butte Community Union v. Lewis (1986), 219 Mont. 426, 712 P.2d 1309, we held that: 
If a fundamental right is infringed or a suspect classification established, the government has 
to show a “compelling state interest” for its action. 
. . . 
 . . . in order to be fundamental, a right must be found within Montana's Declaration of 
Rights or be a right“without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little 
meaning.” In the Matter of C.H. (Mont.1984), [210 Mont. 184, 201], 683 P.2d 931, 940, 41 
St.Rep. 997, 1007. 
Butte Community Union, 219 Mont. at 430, 712 P.2d at 1311. 
. . . 
 ¶ 57 We held, however, that a middle-tier level of scrutiny will be applied when a right is 
implicated which, though not contained in our declaration of rights, is referred to in our constitution 
even though the constitutional provision in question is merely directive to the legislature. We held 
that: 
A benefit lodged in our State Constitution is an interest whose abridgement requires 
something more than a rational relationship to a governmental objective. 
. . . 
 . . . Where constitutionally significant interests are implicated by governmental 
classification, arbitrary lines should be condemned. Further, there should be balancing of the 
rights infringed and the governmental interest to be served by such infringement. 
Butte Community Union, 219 Mont. at 434, 712 P.2d at 1313-14. 
. . . 
 ¶ 59 We elaborated on the level of scrutiny for statutes or rules which implicate rights 
guaranteed in our declaration of rights in Wadsworth v. State (1996), 275 Mont. 287, 911 P.2d 1165. 
There we held that, “the inalienable right to pursue life's basic necessities is stated in the Declaration 
of Rights and is therefore a fundamental right.”    Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at 299, 911 P.2d at 1172. 
 ¶ 60 We also held in Wadsworth that the nature of interest affected by state action dictates the 
standard of review that we apply and that: “[t]he most stringent standard, strict scrutiny, is imposed 
when the action complained of interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or discriminates 
against a suspect class.”  Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at 302, 911 P.2d at 1174(citations omitted). 
 ¶ 61 In Wadsworth, we gave the following explanation of what is required by strict scrutiny: 
Strict scrutiny of a legislative act requires the government to show a compelling state interest 
for its action. Shapiro [v. Thompson (1969)], 394 U.S. [618] at 634, 89 S.Ct. [1322] 1331 [22 
L.Ed.2d 600]. When the government intrudes upon a fundamental right, any compelling state 
interest for doing so must be closely tailored to effectuate only that compelling state interest. 
[State v.] Pastos, [(1994), 269 Mont. 43, 47] 887 P.2d [199] at 202 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail 
(1978), 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618).   In addition to the necessity that the 
State show a compelling state interest for invasion of a fundamental right, the State, to sustain 
the validity of such invasion, must also show that the choice of legislative action is the least 
onerous path that can be taken to achieve the state objective. Pfost v. State (1985), 219 Mont. 
206, 216, 713 P.2d 495, 505. 
Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at 302, 911 P.2d at 1174. 
 ¶ 62 Finally, in language relevant to this case, we held in Wadsworth that, “while DOR's 
conflict of interest policy or rule is at issue rather than a statute, we, nevertheless, apply strict scrutiny 
analysis since the operation of that rule implicates Wadsworth's fundamental right to the opportunity 
to pursue employment.” Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at 303, 911 P.2d at 1174 (emphasis added). 
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 ¶ 63 Applying the preceding rules to the facts in this case, we conclude that the right to a 
clean and healthful environment is a fundamental right because it is guaranteed by the Declaration of 
Rights found at Article II, Section 3 of Montana's Constitution, and that any statute or rule which 
implicates that right must be strictly scrutinized and can only survive scrutiny if the State establishes a 
compelling state interest and that its action is closely tailored to effectuate that interest and is the least 
onerous path that can be taken to achieve the State's objective. 
 ¶ 64 State action which implicates those rights provided for in Article IX, Section 1 would 
normally not be subject to strict scrutiny because those rights are not found in Montana's Declaration 
of Rights. Those rights would normally be subject to a middle-tier of scrutiny because lodged 
elsewhere in our state constitution. However, we conclude that the right to a clean and healthful 
environment guaranteed by Article II, Section 3, and those rights provided for in Article IX, Section 1 
were intended by the constitution's framers to be interrelated and interdependent and that state or 
private action which implicates either, must be scrutinized consistently. Therefore, we will apply strict 
scrutiny to state or private action which implicates either constitutional provision. 
 ¶ 65 A thorough review of the discussion and debate among the delegates to our 1972 
Constitutional Convention leads us to the further conclusion that the nature of the environmental 
rights provided by Articles II and IX cannot be interpreted separately, but that it was the delegates' 
intention that the two provisions compliment each other and be applied in tandem. Therefore, we look 
to the records of the convention discussion and debate to determine the showing that must be made 
before the rights are implicated and strict scrutiny applied. 
 ¶ 66 Article IX, Section 1 was reported to the floor of the constitutional convention by the 
Natural Resources and Agricultural Committee on March 1, 1972.  Montana Constitutional 
Convention, Vol. IV at 1198-99. As originally proposed, however, Article IX, Section 1(1) required 
that “the state and each person . . . maintain and enhance the Montana environment for present and 
future generations.”  Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV at 1200, March 1, 1972. It did not 
provide, as does the current provision, the obligation to “maintain and improve a clean and healthful 
environment.”  See Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV at 1200, March 1, 1972; Mont. 
Const. art. IX, § 1(1). The provision, as introduced, was thought by members of the committee to be 
the strongest environmental protection provision found in any state constitution. Montana 
Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV at 1200, March 1, 1972. Delegate McNeil explained that 
descriptive adjectives were not included preceding the word environment such as healthful or 
unsoiled, because the majority felt that the current Montana environment encompassed all of those 
descriptive adjectives. Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV at 1200, March 1, 1972. He 
further explained that descriptive adjectives were not originally included because: 
The majority felt that the use of the word “healthful” would permit those who would pollute 
our environment to parade in some doctors who could say that if a person can walk around 
with four pounds of arsenic in his lungs or SO2 gas in his lungs and wasn't dead, that that 
would be a healthful environment. We strongly believe the majority does that our provision or 
proposal is stronger than using the word “healthful.” 
Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV at 1201, March 1, 1972. 
 ¶ 67 In discussing the interrelationship of subsections (1) and (3), Delegate McNeil stated: 
Subsection (3) mandates the Legislature to provide adequate remedies to protect the 
environmental life-support system from degradation. The committee intentionally avoided 
definitions, to preclude being restrictive. And the term “environmental life support system” is 
all-encompassing, including but not limited to air, water, and land; and whatever 
interpretation is afforded this phrase by the Legislature and courts, there is no question that it 
cannot be degraded. 
Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV at 1201, March 1, 1972 (emphasis added). 
 ¶ 68 There were delegates including Delegate Campbell who felt that without descriptive 
adjectives, such as “clean and healthful” prior to the term “environment,” Article IX, Section 1 lacked 
the force that the majority had intended. Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV at 1204, March 
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1, 1972. However, the proponents of Section 1 as introduced, insisted that the subsection require that 
the environment not only be maintained but improved.   See Delegate John Anderson cmts. (Montana 
Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV at 1204, March 1, 1972). 
 ¶ 69 Delegate McNeil explained the committee's concern about including “clean and 
healthful” as follows: 
[T]he majority felt this would permit degradation of the present Montana environment to a 
level as defined in Illinois, which may be clean and healthful.   And our intention was to 
permit no degradation from the present environment and affirmatively require enhancement 
of what we have now. 
Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV at 1205, March 1, 1972 (emphasis added). 
 ¶ 70 In further discussing the interrelationship between subsections (1) and (3) of Article IX, 
Delegate McNeil stated: 
The majority proposal before you now does recommend, as did Mr. Lindbergh, government 
monitoring. It goes further than that and directs the Legislature to provide remedies to prevent 
degradation.   This is anticipatory. 
Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV at 126, March 1, 1972 (emphasis added). 
The proposal mandates the legislature to prevent degradation and to prevent unreasonable 
depletion. Now, that includes private property. 
Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1221, March 1, 1972 (emphasis added). 
. . . 
 ¶ 73 In concluding remarks in opposition to amending the committee majority's proposed 
Article IX, Section 1, Delegate McNeil gave the following explanation for the language being 
recommended: 
We did not want the Supreme Court of this state or the Legislature to be able to say that the 
environment in Montana, as we know right now, can be degraded to a healthful environment. 
So our purpose in leaving that word out was to strengthen it. I would like also to remind the 
delegates that the Illinois provision does not contain subparagraph 3 of the majority proposal, 
[Article IX, Section 1(3) ] which speaks precisely to the point that concerned Jerry Cate so 
much, and that is there is no provision by which the Legislature can prevent and this is 
anticipatory can prevent unreasonable depletion of the natural resources. I submit if you will 
read that majority proposal again and again, you will find that it is the strongest of any 
constitution. . . . 
Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1243, March 1, 1972. 
 ¶ 74 Delegate Foster also gave the following defense of the language as originally proposed: 
I feel that if we, as a Constitutional Convention of Montana, use our line of defense on the 
environment on the basis of healthful, then we, in fact, might as well forget it, because what 
I'm concerned about in Montana is not a healthful environment. This country is going to have 
to address itself to the question of a healthful environment. What I'm concerned about is an 
environment that is better than healthful. If all we have is a survivable environment, then 
we've lost the battle. We have nothing left of importance. The federal government will see to 
it one way or another, if it's in its power, that we have an environment in which we can 
manage to crawl around or to survive or to in some way stay “alive”. But the environment 
that I'm concerned about is that stage of quality of the environment which is above healthful; 
and if we put in the Constitution that the only line of defense is a healthful environment and 
that I have to show, in fact, that my health is being damaged in order to find some relief, then 
we've lost the battle; so I oppose this amendment. 
Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1243-44, March 1, 1972. 
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 ¶ 75 In the end advocates for adding the descriptive language “clean and healthful” prevailed. 
However, it was not on the basis that they wanted less protection than articulated by Delegates 
McNeil and Foster, it was because they felt the additional language was necessary in order to assure 
the objectives articulated by Delegates McNeil and Foster.  See Delegate Campbell cmts. (Montana 
Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1246, March 1, 1972). It was agreed by both sides of the debate 
that it was the convention's intention to adopt whatever the convention could agree was the stronger 
language. See Delegate McNeil cmts. (Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV at 1209, March 1, 
1972). 
 ¶ 76 Although Article IX, Section 1(1), (2), and (3) were all approved by the convention on 
March 1, 1972 (Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1251, 1254-55, March 1, 1972) the 
right to a clean and healthful environment was not included in the Bill of Rights until six days later on 
March 7, 1972. On that date, Delegate Burkhart moved to add “the right to a clean and healthful 
environment” to the other inalienable rights listed in Article II, Section 3 of the proposed constitution. 
Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1637, March 7, 1972. He explained his intention that it 
interrelate with those rights provided for and previously adopted in Article IX, Section 1. Montana 
Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1637, March 7, 1972. He also stated that it was his intention 
through the addition of this right to the Bill of Rights to give force to the language of the preamble to 
the constitution.  Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1637, March 7, 1972. Burkhart stated: 
“I think it's a beautiful statement, and it seems to me that what I am proposing here is in concert with 
what's proposed in that Preamble. . . .”  Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1638, March 7, 
1972. Delegate Eck concurred that including the additional language in Article II, Section 3, was 
consistent with the intention of the Natural Resources Committee when it reported Article IX, Section 
1. Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1638, March 7, 1972. The right to a clean and 
healthy environment was, therefore, included as a fundamental right by a vote of 79 to 7. Montana 
Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1640, March 7, 1972. We have previously cited with approval 
the following language from 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Laws  § 16 (1984): 
 The prime effort or fundamental purpose, in construing a constitutional provision, is 
to ascertain and to give effect to the intent of the framers and of the people who adopted it. 
The court, therefore, should constantly keep in mind the object sought to be accomplished ... 
and proper regard should be given to the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.... 
 General Agric. Corp. v. Moore (1975), 166 Mont. 510, 518, 534 P.2d 859, 864. 
 ¶ 77 We conclude, based on the eloquent record of the Montana Constitutional Convention 
that to give effect to the rights guaranteed by Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1 of the 
Montana Constitution they must be read together and consideration given to all of the provisions of 
Article IX, Section 1 as well as the preamble to the Montana Constitution. In doing so, we conclude 
that the delegates' intention was to provide language and protections which are both anticipatory and 
preventative. The delegates did not intend to merely prohibit that degree of environmental degradation 
which can be conclusively linked to ill health or physical endangerment. Our constitution does not 
require that dead fish float on the surface of our state's rivers and streams before its farsighted 
environmental protections can be invoked. The delegates repeatedly emphasized that the rights 
provided for in subparagraph (1) of Article IX, Section 1 was linked to the legislature's obligation in 
subparagraph (3) to provide adequate remedies for degradation of the environmental life support 
system and to prevent unreasonable degradation of natural resources. 
 ¶ 78 We conclude, therefore, that the District Court erred when it held that Montana's 
constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment was not implicated, absent a demonstration 
that public health is threatened or that current water quality standards are affected o such an extent 
that a significant impact has been had on either the Landers Fork or Blackfoot River. 
 ¶ 79 We conclude that the constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment and to be 
free from unreasonable degradation of that environment is implicated based on the Plaintiffs' 
demonstration that the pumping tests proposed by SPJV would have added a known carcinogen such 
as arsenic to the environment in concentrations greater than the concentrations present in the receiving 
water and that the DEQ or its predecessor after studying the issue and conducting hearings has 
concluded that discharges containing carcinogenic parameters greater than the concentrations of those 
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parameters in the receiving water has a significant impact which requires review pursuant to 
Montana's policy of nondegradation set forth at § 75-5-303, MCA. The fact that DEQ has a rule 
consistent with § 75-5-317(2)(j), MCA (1995), is of no consequence. As we have previously held in 
Wadsworth, the constitution applies to agency rules as well as to statutes. 
 ¶ 80 We conclude that for purposes of the facts presented in this case, § 75-5-303, MCA is a 
reasonable legislative implementation of the mandate provided for in Article IX, Section 1 and that to 
the extent § 75-5-317(2)(j), MCA (1995) arbitrarily excludes certain “activities” from nondegradation 
review without regard to the nature or volume of the substances being discharged, it violates those 
environmental rights guaranteed by Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1 of the Montana 
Constitution. Our holding is limited to § 75-5-317(2)(j), MCA (1995), as applied to the facts in this 
case. We have not been asked to and do not hold that this section facially implicates constitutional 
rights. 
 ¶ 81 Based on these holdings, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand to the 
District Court for strict scrutiny of the statutory provision in question, and in particular for a 
determination of whether there is a compelling state interest for the enactment of that statute based on 
the criteria we articulated in Wadsworth v. State. 
 ¶ 82 The judgment of the District Court is reversed and this case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Questions & Discussion 
 
1. Do you agree with those at the Constitutional Convention who argued that including the word 
“healthful” weakened the Constitutional guarantee?  Does it depend on whether the word refers to 
humans or to the environment being full of health?  Does “healthy environment” mean healthy for 
humans or an environment that is intrinsically healthy?  What difference does it make? 
 
2. How would you evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of the Montana Constitutional provision 
compared to traditional nuisance law?   
 
3. The Montana Supreme Court further applied its constitutional provision in the case Cape-France 
Enterprises v. The Estate of Peed, 305 Mont. 513, 29 P.3d 1011 (2001), in which it held that “the 
protections and mandates of this provision to private action – and thus to private parties – as well” as 
to state action.  Thus, “it would be unlawful for Cape-France, a private business entity, to drill a well 
on its property in the face of substantial evidence that doing so may cause significant degradation of 
uncontaminated aquifers and pose serious public health risks.”  The court held that it would be a 
violation of the state’s obligation under the constitution for it to grant specific performance of a 
contract for the sale of the land in question.  See Naber, Murky Waters: Private Action and the Right 
to a Clean and Healthful Environment – An examination of Cape-France Enterprises v. Estate of 
Peed, 64 MONT. L. REV. 357 (2003); B. Thompson, Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History 
and Future of Montana’s Environmental Provisions, 64 MONT.L.REV. 157 (2003) 
 
Comment:  Litigating State Constitutional Protections 
More than a dozen state constitutions in the United States have enacted provisions that 
guarantee environmental rights.  Not all of them are enforced to the extent of Montana’s provision, 
however.  Two major procedural hurdles have been encountered: self-execution and standing. 
 Self-execution 
Some courts have held that constitutional provisions on the right to environment are non-self-
executing and require legislative action before they can be enforced. When a state constitutional 
environmental provision is ambiguous as to its self-executing status, judges tend to declare that the 
provisions amount to statements of policy or affirmations of existing legislative authority, rather than 
new, enforceable rights or obligations. When the constitutional provision refers generally to 
conservation of resources, courts may find the terms too vague to be enforced without the courts being 
forced to engage in law-making in violation of the separation of powers.  In such instances, 
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individuals will be barred from invoking constitutional provisions unless and until the legislature 
enacts measures to establish precise regulations and standards governing the topic. 
 Courts in Pennsylvania, Louisiana and Michigan have declared their provisions to be self-
executing or have found their provisions executed by legislative action. See Save Ourselves, Inc. v 
Louisiana Environmental Control Commission, 452 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1984); Mich. Const. art. 4, § 52. 
In the Pennsylvania case Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 302 A.2d 886 
(Pa. Commw. Ct.), aff’d  311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973), the government sued a private company to enjoin 
its construction of an observation tower overlooking Gettysburg National Military Park.  The lower 
court held that the provision imposed a self-executing duty on the government to protect the 
environment against private conduct as well as state action, because “the despoliation of the 
environment is an act to be expected, in our private ownership society, from public persons.” Id. at 
892 The court found that the constitutional provision was no vaguer than the guarantees of due 
process and equal protection and thus could be enforced.  On the merits the trial and appellate courts 
held that construction of the tower did not violate the constitutional guarantee.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court affirmed, but split four ways on the rationale.  One justice declined to join any 
opinion, but simply concurred in the result that upheld the decision below.  Two justices affirmed 
without discussing the issue of self-execution while two others concluded that the constitutional 
provision was not self-executing. The opinion for the court identified a need for property owners to 
be able to plan for the use of their property, reasoning that without a more specific standard, “a 
property owner would not know and would have no way, short of expensive litigation, of finding out 
what he could do with his property.” 311 A.2d 566 at 593 The Court considered that if the vaguely-
worded provision were “self-executing, action taken under it would pose serious problems of 
constitutionality, under both the equal protection clause and the due process clause.” Id., at 595.  Two 
judges dissented, finding the provision self-executing and the proposed tower in violation of it 
because the provision “installed the common law public trust doctrine as a constitutional right to 
environmental protection susceptible to enforcement in an action in equity.”  Id. at 596.    
 A subsequent Pennsylvania case Payne v. Kassab, 21 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff’d 
361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976), affirmed the self-executing nature of the Pennsylvania Constitution’s 
Section 27.  Citizens invoked the provision to challenge a street-widening project that would have 
encroached on a commons area in the town of Wilkes-Barre.  Like the earlier case, however, the court 
decided on the merits that the action did not violate the constitutional guaranteed.  The Supreme 
Court affirmed, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976) and developed a three part test for determining violations 
that “is so weak that litigants using it to challenge environmentally damaging projects are almost 
always unsuccessful.” John Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When it 
Protects the Environment: Part I – An Interpretive Framework for Article I, Section 27, 103 DICK. L. 
REV. 693, 696 (1999). 
 Standing 
 The United States Supreme Court began addressing the standing of individuals to bring 
lawsuits to protect the environment about the time many of the state constitutional provisions were 
being enacted. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 
669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The decisions expanded standing to allow 
plaintiffs to sue for aesthetic or environmental injuries.  In 1992, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555 (1992) reiterated, however, that those seeking to sue must meet the difficult standing 
requirements of an imminent injury-in-fact, a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of, and an available remedy that will redress the injury. Id. at 560-61. 
 Many of the state constitutional provisions appear intended to liberalize standing rules.  In 
Illinois, the constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment creates no new cause of action, 
City of Elgin v. County of Cook, 660 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. 1995).but it does give “standing to an individual 
to bring an environmental action for a grievance common to members of the public,” even in cases 
where a resident may not be able to demonstrate the “particularized” harm that is normally required. 
Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1041 (Ill. 1999)  In Glisson, however, the Illinois Court 
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found that the constitutional guarantee was not broad enough to grant standing to an individual who 
sought to protect biodiversity through obtaining a review of the construction of a dam that would 
impact two endangered species.  
 Although not all courts have given effect to this intent, some of them have broadly 
interpreted the standards in favor of plaintiffs.  Pennsylvania courts fall in the latter category.  The 
state’s requirements for standing demand that the plaintiffs have a substantial, direct, and immediate 
interest in the subject matter of the litigation.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has indicated that 
environmental litigants may meet this test because “[a]esthetic and environmental well-being are 
important aspects of the quality of life in our society.”  Franklin Township v. Commonwealth, 
Department of Environmental Resources, 452 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1982).  Because section 27 
establishes a local government’s duty to protect its citizen’s quality of life, localities may challenge 
the state’s issuance of a permit for establishment of a toxic waste disposal site. Id.  Other decisions 
have affirmed that Section 27 should “normally” be broadly construed, “especially where a 
potentially affected locality or private citizen, or specifically empowered watchdog agency, seeks 
review of an environmental sensitive … decision.” Commonwealth, Pa. Game Comm’n v. 
Commonwealth, Dept. of Envtl. Resources, 509 A.2d 877, 883-84 (Pa. Comm2. Ct. 1986), aff’d 555 
A.2d 812 (Pa. 1989).   
 The Supreme Court of Hawai’i has also given broad standing to private individuals to 
enforce environmental laws, relying on its constitution, art. XI, sec. 9.  In Life of the Land v. Land 
Use Comm’n of the State of Hawai’i, 623 P.2d 431 (Haw. 1981) the court granted standing to an 
environmental organization which sought to challenge a reclassification of certain lands which were 
not owned by any of the organization’s members.  The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had 
standing due to their “aesthetic and environmental interests,” which the court deemed to “personal” 
and “special” interests or rights guaranteed by Art. XI, sec. 9 of the Constitution.  Subsequent cases 
have affirmed that the Constitutional provision gives individuals standing to sue for environmental 
damage or to enforce environmental laws. See Richard v. Metcalf, 921 P.2d 122 (Haw. 1997); Kahuna 
Sunset Owners Ass’n v. Mahui County Council, 948 P.2d 122 (Haw. 1997). 
 Where the procedural hurdles have been overcome or are absent, as in about one-third of the 
states with constitutional references to the environment, state courts have enforced environmental 
rights.  This is also the case in other countries which have enacted constitutional guarantees of 
environmental rights, including many developing countries where the concept of sustainable 
development has been critically important.  South Africa is one of them.   
 
B. South Africa 
 
Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General Environmental Management, 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province, and Others 
Case no CCT 67/06; ILDC 783 (ZA 2007) (footnotes omitted or renumbered) 
Ngcobo J: 
Introduction 
[1] This application for leave to appeal against the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal concerns 
the nature and scope of the obligations of environmental authorities when they make decisions that 
may have a substantial detrimental impact on the environment. In particular, it concerns the 
interaction between social and economic development and the protection of the environment. It arises 
out of a decision by the Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga 
province (the Department), the third respondent, to grant the Inama Family Trust (the Trust) authority 
in terms of section 22(1) of the Environment Conservation Act, 1989 (ECA) [Act 73 of 1989], to 
construct a filling station on a property in White River, Mpumalanga (the property).  
. . . 
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Factual background 
[8] During July 2000, the Trust, through an environmental consultant firm, Globecon Environmental 
Management Services (Globecon), applied to the Department for authorisation to construct a filling 
station on the property in terms of these provisions. A scoping report, a geotechnical and 
geohydrological report (the Geo3 report) were submitted in support of the application.13 The scoping 
report dealt with, among other matters, socio-economic factors and the presence of an aquifer in the 
property. In addition, the scoping report contained an evaluation of the impact of the proposed filling 
station, identified certain areas of concern and proposed recommendations to address these concerns.  
[9] Under the heading “Socio-Economic Components”, the scoping report referred to the implications 
of the proposed filling station for noise, visual impacts, traffic, municipal services, safety and crime, 
and cultural and historical sites. It also dealt with the feasibility of the proposed filling station and 
stated that—  
Various other locations do exist for the proposed development, as the positioning of a filling 
station is dictated by traffic flow, visibility, availability of land and the location of other 
filling stations in the area.  
As the proposed filling station is directly targeting traffic moving between White River, 
Hazyview and the Numbi Gate of the Kruger National Park, a specific location along the said 
route was identified. Once the site was identified a feasibility study was done based on 
locating the filling station at the specific site. Once the feasibility of the filling station on the 
specific site was identified, and the availability of the property was confirmed, no other 
options were considered.  
[10] One of the issues identified in the report as requiring attention was the protection of an existing 
aquifer, a significant clean groundwater resource below the surface of the property. In the past this 
aquifer had been used to augment the water supply in White River. The report noted that the aquifer 
needed protection from pollution. The report recommended that the water quality of the aquifer 
through the borehole should be tested bi-annually. It proposed that if the Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry (Water Affairs and Forestry) required it, an impermeable layer should be installed in the 
base of the pit to ensure that no contaminants from the tanks reach the aquifer. In addition, it 
recommended that a reconciliation programme should be in place to detect any leakage. These 
recommendations were made in the light of the Geo3 report.  
[11] The applicant, through its environmental consultants, Ecotechnik, objected to the construction of 
the proposed filling station on several grounds, one being that the quality of the water in the aquifer 
might be contaminated. Ecotechnik submitted an evaluation report which criticised the consideration 
of alternatives to the development as being vague and non-specific and pointed out that “demand and 
activity alternatives were not investigated.” The report also took issue with the manner in which the 
public participation process had been conducted, pointing out that there were interested persons who 
had not had the opportunity to express their views on a proposed filling station that might affect them.  
                                                 
13 A scoping report is an environmental impact report that must be submitted in support of an application for 
authorisation under section 22(1) of ECA. Section 26, which empowers the Minister to make regulations 
concerning the scope and content of the environmental reports envisaged in section 22(1), contemplates that 
reports will include matters such as the identification of the economic and social interests which may be affected 
by the proposed activity; the extent and the nature of the effect of the proposed activity on social and economic 
interests; and how the adverse impact is to be minimised. By regulations regarding activities identified under 
section 21(1), GN R1183 of 5 September 1997, the Minister published the regulations concerning the scope and 
the contents of reports. These reports have come to be known as “scoping reports”. The provisions of ECA 
relating to the nature and scope of the environmental authority's obligation when considering an application for 
authorisation under section 22(1), as well as the scope and contents of the report that must be submitted in 
support of such application, must be understood in the light of the provisions of NEMA. 
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[12] There was a further exchange of reports by the opposing consultants which dealt with the 
adequacy or otherwise of the proposed measures for the prevention of the contamination of the 
aquifer. In the light of these reports and in particular, the existence of the aquifer, the Department 
referred the Geo3 report together with the objections raised by the applicant to Water Affairs and 
Forestry for comment.  
[13] In a very brief response, Water Affairs and Forestry accepted the Geo3 report and, on the issue of 
underground water, required “[t]he proposed developer [to] ensure that no pollution of the 
groundwater … take[s] place. And [that it] must be monitored as set out in the report and in 
accordance [with] all the relevant Regulations as set out by the Dept of Water Affairs and Forestry.” 
Nothing was said about the installation of an impermeable layer, which according to the scoping 
report was to be installed if Water Affairs and Forestry required this. However, it subsequently 
transpired that the Water Quality Management and Water Utilization divisions of Water Affairs and 
Forestry had neither received nor commented on the Geo3 report.  
[14] The application was considered in the first instance by Mr Hlatshwayo, the Deputy-Director in 
the Department. On 9 January 2002 authorisation was granted over the objection of the applicant. A 
record of decision was issued, which contained the decision and conditions upon which authorisation 
was granted. This decision authorised the construction of a filling station, three fuel tanks, a 
convenience store, a canopy, ablution facilities and driveways providing access to and from the 
nearby streets. The record of decision was signed by Dr Batchelor, the Director of Environmental 
Management in the Department.  
. . . 
 [16] The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. One of the grounds of appeal was that the 
need, desirability and sustainability of the proposed filling station had not been considered. It was 
alleged that this aspect was not addressed in the scoping report submitted by Globecon. It was also 
pointed out that the proposed filling station was within a radius of five kilometres from six other 
filling stations that adequately served the needs of the community. The applicant alleged that there 
had recently been a decline in the growth of fuel consumption in White River. The viability of 
existing filling stations would be affected and this had been exacerbated by the introduction of three 
new filling stations in the area.  
. . . 
Issues presented 
. . . 
 [34] . . . The questions which fall to be considered in this application are therefore, firstly, the nature 
and scope of the obligation to consider the social, economic and environmental impact of a proposed 
development; second, whether the environmental authorities complied with that obligation; and, if the 
environmental authorities did not comply with that obligation, the appropriate relief.  
[35] Before addressing these issues, it is necessary to consider two preliminary matters. The first is 
the proper cause of action in this application. The other is whether the application raises a 
constitutional matter, and if so, whether it is in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal.  
The proper cause of action 
. . . 
 [39] . . . In the course of oral argument it became clear that the main ground of attack was that the 
environmental authorities failed to consider the impact of the proposed filling station on socio-
economic conditions, a matter which they were required to consider. The central question in this 
application therefore is whether the environmental authorities failed to take into consideration matters 
that they were required to consider prior to granting the authorisation under section 22(1) of ECA.  
Does the application raise a constitutional issue? 
[40] Section 24 of the Constitution guarantees to everyone the right to a healthy environment and 
contemplates that legislation will be enacted for the protection of the environment. ECA and NEMA 
are legislation which give effect to this provision of the Constitution. The question to be considered in 
this application is the proper interpretation of the relevant provisions of ECA and NEMA and, in 
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particular, the nature of the obligations imposed by these provisions on the environmental authorities. 
The proper interpretation of these provisions raises a constitutional issue. So, too, does the application 
of PAJA. It follows therefore that the present application raises a constitutional issue.  
Is it in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal? 
[41] This case raises an important question concerning the obligation of state organs when making 
decisions that may have a substantial impact on the environment. In particular, it concerns the nature 
and scope of the obligation to consider socio-economic conditions. The need to protect the 
environment cannot be gainsaid. So, too, is the need for social and economic development. How these 
two compelling needs interact, their impact on decisions affecting the environment and the obligations 
of environmental authorities in this regard, are important constitutional questions. In these 
circumstances, it is therefore in the interests of justice that leave to appeal be granted to consider these 
issues.  
[42] In order to put the issues involved in this case in context and to evaluate the cogency of the 
constitutional challenge, it is necessary to understand both the constitutional and the legislative 
frameworks for the protection and management of the environment.  
The relevant constitutional provision 
[43] The Constitution deals with the environment in section 24 and proclaims the right of everyone—  
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and  
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, 
through reasonable legislative and other measures that—  
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and 
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development. 
Sustainable development 
[44] What is immediately apparent from section 24 is the explicit recognition of the obligation to 
promote justifiable “economic and social development”. Economic and social development is 
essential to the well-being of human beings.14 This Court has recognised that socio-economic rights 
that are set out in the Constitution are indeed vital to the enjoyment of other human rights guaranteed 
in the Constitution.15 But development cannot subsist upon a deteriorating environmental base. 
Unlimited development is detrimental to the environment and the destruction of the environment is 
detrimental to development. Promotion of development requires the protection of the environment. 
Yet the environment cannot be protected if development does not pay attention to the costs of 
environmental destruction. The environment and development are thus inexorably linked. And as has 
been observed—  
“[E]nvironmental stresses and patterns of economic development are linked one to another. 
Thus agricultural policies may lie at the root of land, water, and forest degradation. Energy 
policies are associated with the global greenhouse effect, with acidification, and with 
deforestation for fuelwood in many developing nations. These stresses all threaten economic 
development. Thus economics and ecology must be completely integrated in decision making 
                                                 
14  Declaration on the Right to Development adopted by General Assembly Resolution 41/128 of 4 December 
1986, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/a41r128.htm, accessed on 4 June 2007. Article 1 asserts that 
“[t]he right to development is an inalienable human right”. The Preamble describes development as “a 
comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the 
well-being of the entire population”. 
 
15  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); 2000 
(11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
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and lawmaking processes not just to protect the environment, but also to protect and promote 
development. Economy is not just about the production of wealth, and ecology is not just 
about the protection of nature; they are both equally relevant for improving the lot of 
humankind.”16  
[45] The Constitution recognises the interrelationship between the environment and development; 
indeed it recognises the need for the protection of the environment while at the same time it 
recognises the need for social and economic development. It contemplates the integration of 
environmental protection and socio-economic development. It envisages that environmental 
considerations will be balanced with socio-economic considerations through the ideal of sustainable 
development. This is apparent from section 24(b)(iii) which provides that the environment will be 
protected by securing “ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development”. Sustainable development and sustainable 
use and exploitation of natural resources are at the core of the protection of the environment.  
The concept of sustainable development in international law 
[46] Sustainable development is an evolving concept of international law. Broadly speaking its 
evolution can be traced to the 1972 Stockholm Conference. That Conference stressed the relationship 
between development and the protection of the environment, in particular, the need “to ensure that 
development is compatible with the need to protect and improve [the] environment for the benefit of 
their population”.17 The principles which were proclaimed at this conference provide a setting for the 
development of the concept of sustainable development.18 Since then the concept of sustainable 
development has received considerable endorsement by the international community.19 Indeed in 
2002 people from over 180 countries gathered in our country for the Johannesburg World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) to reaffirm that sustainable development is a world priority.20  
[47] But it was the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (the 
Brundtland Report) which “coined” the term “sustainable development”.21 The Brundtland Report 
defined sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. It described sustainable 
development as—  
“[i]n essence … a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of 
investments, the orientation of technological development; and institutional change are all in 
harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations”.  
                                                 
16 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future (Brundtland 
Report), http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/docs_key_conferences.htm, link: General Assembly 42nd 
Session: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, accessed on 4 June 2007. Chapter 
1 at para 42. 
 
17  Principle 13 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in 
Stockholm 1972, http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503, accessed on 
4 June 2007. 
 
18  Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry in Gabþíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) 37 
I.L.M. 162 (1998). 
 
19  Id. 
 
20  Segger and Weeramantry (eds) Sustainable Justice: Reconciling Economic, Social and Environmental Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2005) 561. 
 
21  Sands Principles of International Environmental Law 2 ed (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003) 
252. 
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[48] This report argued for a merger of environmental and economic considerations in decision-
making and urged the proposition that “the goals of economic and social development must be 
defined in terms of sustainability”. It called for a new approach to development — “a type of 
development that integrates production with resource conservation and enhancement, and that links 
both to the provision for all of an adequate livelihood base and equitable access to resources.” The 
concept of sustainable development, according to the report, “provides a framework for the 
integration of environment[al] policies and development strategies”.  
[49] The 1992 Rio Conference made the concept of sustainable development a central feature of its 
Declaration.22 The Rio Declaration is especially important because it reflects a real consensus in the 
international community on some core principles of environmental protection and sustainable 
development.23 It developed general principles on sustainable development and provided a framework 
for the development of the law of sustainable development.  
[50] At the heart of the Rio Declaration are Principles 3 and 4. Principle 3 provides that “[t]he right to 
development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of 
present and future generations.” Principle 4 provides that “[i]n order to achieve sustainable 
development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process 
and cannot be considered in isolation from it.” The idea that development and environmental 
protection must be reconciled is central to the concept of sustainable development. At the core of this 
Principle is the principle of integration of environmental protection and socio-economic development.  
[51] Commentators on international law have understandably refrained from attempting to define the 
concept of sustainable development. Instead they have identified the evolving elements of the concept 
of sustainable development.24 These include the integration of environmental protection and 
economic development (the principle of integration); sustainable utilisation of natural resources (the 
principle of sustainable use and exploitation of natural resources); the right to development; the 
pursuit of equity in the use and allocation of natural resources (the principle of intra-generational 
equity); the need to preserve natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations (the 
principle of inter-generational and intra-generational equity); and the need to interpret and apply rules 
of international law in an integrated systematic manner.  
[52] The principle of integration of environmental protection and development reflects a—  
“… commitment to integrate environmental considerations into economic and other development, 
and to take into account the needs of economic and other social development in crafting, applying 
and interpreting environmental obligations.”  
This is an important aspect of sustainable development because “its formal application requires the 
collection and dissemination of environmental information, and the conduct of environmental impact 
                                                 
22  The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on 3–
14 June 1992, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm, accessed on 4 June 2007. 
This Conference adopted among other instruments, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (the 
Rio Declaration). 
 
23  Boyle and Freestone (eds) International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future 
Challenges (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999) 4. 
 
24  . . . Sands identifies five recurring elements which appear to comprise the legal concept of sustainable 
development as reflected in international agreements. These are:  
• “the need to take into consideration the needs of present and future generations; 
• the acceptance, on environmental protection grounds, of limits placed upon the use and exploitation of 
natural resources; 
• the role of equitable principles in the allocation of rights and obligations;  
• the need to integrate all aspects of environment and development; and  
• the need to interpret and apply rules of international law in an integrated and systemic manner.” 
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assessments.” The practical significance of the integration of the environmental and developmental 
considerations is that environmental considerations will now increasingly be a feature of economic 
and development policy.  
[53] The principle of integration of environmental protection and socio-economic development is 
therefore fundamental to the concept of sustainable development. Indeed economic development, 
social development and the protection of the environment are now considered pillars of sustainable 
development. As recognised in the WSSD, States have assumed—  
“ … a collective responsibility to advance and strengthen the interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing pillars of sustainable development — economic development, social development and 
environmental protection — at the local, national, regional and global levels.”25  
[54] The concept of sustainable development has received approval in a judgment of the International 
Court of Justice. This much appears from the judgment of the International Court of Justice in 
Gabþíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) where the Court held—  
“Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons, constantly interfered with 
nature. In the past, this was often done without consideration of the effects upon the environment. 
Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness of the risks for mankind—for 
present and future generations—of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated 
pace, new norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of instruments 
during the last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and such new 
standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new activities but also when 
continuing with activities begun in the past. This need to reconcile economic development with 
protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development.”26  
[55] The integration of economic development, social development and environmental protection 
implies the need to reconcile and accommodate these three pillars of sustainable development. 
Sustainable development provides a framework for reconciling socio-economic development and 
environmental protection. This role of the concept of sustainable development as a mediating 
principle in reconciling environmental and developmental considerations was recognised by Vice-
President Weeramantry in a separate opinion in Gabþíkovo-Nagymaros, when he said—  
“The Court must hold the balance even between the environmental considerations and the 
development considerations raised by the respective Parties. The principle that enables the 
Court to do so is the principle of sustainable development.”27  
[56] It is in the light of these developments in the international law of environment and sustainable 
development that the concept of sustainable development must be construed and understood in our 
law.  
The concept of sustainable development in our law 
[57] As in international law, the concept of sustainable development has a significant role to play in 
the resolution of environmentally related disputes in our law. It offers an important principle for the 
resolution of tensions between the need to protect the environment on the one hand, and the need for 
                                                 
25  United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs — Division for Sustainable Development 
Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development 2002 para 5, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev 
/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POI_PD.htm, accessed on 4 June 2007. 
 
26  Gabþíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) 37 I.L.M. 162 (1998) 200 at para 140. In a Separate 
Opinion, Vice-President Weeramantry held that the concept of sustainable development is part of international 
customary law. See Separate Opinion at 207. 
  
27  Separate opinion at 204. 
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socio-economic development on the other hand. In this sense, the concept of sustainable development 
provides a framework for reconciling socio-economic development and environmental protection.  
[58] Sustainable development does not require the cessation of socio-economic development but 
seeks to regulate the manner in which it takes place. It recognises that socio-economic development 
invariably brings risk of environmental damage as it puts pressure on environmental resources. It 
envisages that decision-makers guided by the concept of sustainable development will ensure that 
socio-economic developments remain firmly attached to their ecological roots and that these roots are 
protected and nurtured so that they may support future socio-economic developments.  
[59] NEMA, which was enacted to give effect to section 24 of the Constitution, embraces the concept 
of sustainable development. Sustainable development is defined to mean “the integration of social, 
economic and environmental factors into planning, implementation and decision-making for the 
benefit of present and future generations”. This broad definition of sustainable development 
incorporates two of the internationally recognised elements of the concept of sustainable 
development, namely, the principle of integration of environmental protection and socio-economic 
development, and the principle of inter-generational and intra-generational equity. In addition, NEMA 
sets out some of the factors that are relevant to decisions on sustainable development. These factors 
largely reflect international experience. But as NEMA makes it clear, these factors are not 
exhaustive.28  
[60] One of the key principles of NEMA requires people and their needs to be placed at the forefront 
of environmental management — batho pele. It requires all developments to be socially, economically 
and environmentally sustainable. Significantly for the present case, it requires that the social, 
economic and environmental impact of a proposed development be “considered, assessed and 
evaluated” and that any decision made “must be appropriate in the light of such consideration and 
assessment”. This is underscored by the requirement that decisions must take into account the 
interests, needs and values of all interested and affected persons.  
[61] Construed in the light of section 24 of the Constitution, NEMA therefore requires the integration 
of environmental protection and economic and social development. It requires that the interests of the 
environment be balanced with socio-economic interests. Thus, whenever a development which may 
have a significant impact on the environment is planned, it envisages that there will always be a need 
to weigh considerations of development, as underpinned by the right to socio-economic development, 
against environmental considerations, as underpinned by the right to environmental protection. In this 
sense, it contemplates that environmental decisions will achieve a balance between environmental and 
socio-economic developmental considerations through the concept of sustainable development.  
                                                 
28  Section 2(4)(a) of NEMA provides:  
“Sustainable development requires the consideration of all relevant factors including the following: 
(i) That the disturbance of ecosystems and loss of biological diversity are avoided, or, where they cannot 
be altogether avoided, are minimised and remedied;  
(ii) that pollution and degradation of the environment are avoided, or, where they cannot be altogether 
avoided, are minimised and remedied;  
(iii) that the disturbance of landscapes and sites that constitute the nation's cultural heritage is avoided, or 
where it cannot be altogether avoided, is minimised and remedied;  
(iv) that waste is avoided, or where it cannot be altogether avoided, minimised and re-used or recycled 
where possible and otherwise disposed of in a responsible manner;  
(v) that the use and exploitation of non-renewable natural resources is responsible and equitable, and 
takes into account the consequences of the depletion of the resource;  
(vi) that the development, use and exploitation of renewable resources and the ecosystems of which they 
are part do not exceed the level beyond which their integrity is jeopardised;  
(vii) that a risk-averse and cautious approach is applied, which takes into account the limits of current 
knowledge about the consequences of decisions and actions; and  
(viii) that negative impacts on the environment and on people's environmental rights be anticipated and 
prevented, and where they cannot be altogether prevented, are minimised and remedied.” 
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[62] To sum up therefore NEMA makes it abundantly clear that the obligation of the environmental 
authorities includes the consideration of socio-economic factors as an integral part of its 
environmental responsibility.29 It follows therefore that the parties correctly accepted that the 
Department was obliged to consider the impact of the proposed filling station on socio-economic 
conditions. It is within this context that the nature and scope of the obligation to consider socio-
economic factors, in particular, whether it includes the obligation to assess the cumulative impact of 
the proposed filling station and existing ones, and the impact of the proposed filling station on 
existing ones. . . . 
The relevant provisions of NEMA 
[63] The provisions of NEMA which are relevant to this case and which were relied upon by the 
applicant are those that contain the national environmental management principles, the general 
objectives of integrated environmental management and those that deal with the implementation of 
these principles and objectives. . . . 
[67] NEMA principles “apply … to the actions of all organs of state that may significantly affect the 
environment”. They provide not only the general framework within which environmental 
management and implementation decisions must be formulated, but they also provide guidelines that 
should guide state organs in the exercise of their functions that may affect the environment. Perhaps 
more importantly, these principles provide guidance for the interpretation and implementation not 
only of NEMA but any other legislation that is concerned with the protection and management of the 
environment. It is therefore plain that these principles must be observed as they are of considerable 
importance to the protection and management of the environment.  
[68] Apart from these principles, NEMA contemplates the integration of environmental management 
activities and to this extent it outlines the general objectives of integrated environmental management. 
Section 23 of NEMA sets out these general objectives. These include the objectives to promote the 
integration of the national environmental management principles into decisions that may significantly 
affect the environment; and to identify, predict and evaluate actual and potential impact on the 
environment, socio-economic conditions and cultural heritage. Their apparent purpose is to minimise 
the negative impact on the environment and socio-economic conditions and to promote compliance 
with the principles of environmental management.  
[69] The general objectives of integrated environmental management are furthered by section 24 
which deals with the implementation procedures. These require, among other things, that the potential 
impact on the environment, socio-economic conditions and cultural heritage of activities that require 
authorisation under section 22(1) of ECA and which may significantly affect the environment “must 
be considered, investigated and assessed prior to their implementation and reported upon to the organ 
of state charged by law with authorising … the implementation of an activity”. To underscore the 
importance of this requirement, subsection 24(7) requires that any investigation “must, as a 
minimum” investigate the potential impact, including the cumulative effects of the proposed 
development on the environment, socio-economic conditions and cultural heritage. The provisions of 
section 24(7) must of course be read and understood in the light of the regulations that the Minister is 
empowered to make concerning the scope and the contents of reports that must be submitted for 
authorisation required by section 22(1) of ECA.  
[70] Against this background, I now turn to consider the nature and the scope of the obligation to 
consider socio-economic conditions. 
The nature and the scope of the obligation to consider socio-economic conditions 
                                                 
29  This principle was considered in the following cases: BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, 
Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs 2004 (5) SA 124 (W) at 140E–151H; Turnstone Trading CC v 
Director General Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation & Development, case 
no 3104/04 (T), 11 March 2005, unreported, at paras 17–19; MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment 
and Land Affairs v Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd and Another 2006 (5) SA 483 (SCA) at para 15. 
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[71] The nature and the scope of the obligation to consider the impact of the proposed development on 
socio-economic conditions must be determined in the light of the concept of sustainable development 
and the principle of integration of socio-economic development and the protection of the 
environment. Once it is accepted, as it must be, that socio-economic development and the protection 
of the environment are interlinked, it follows that socio-economic conditions have an impact on the 
environment. A proposed filling station may affect the sustainability of existing filling stations with 
consequences for the job security of the employees of those filling stations. But that is not all; if the 
proposed filling station leads to the closure of some or all of the existing filling stations, this has 
consequences for the environment. Filling stations have a limited end use. The underground fuel tanks 
and other infrastructure may have to be removed and land may have to be rehabilitated.  
[72] Apart from this, the proliferation of filling stations in close proximity to one another may 
increase the pre-existing risk of adverse impact on the environment. The risk that comes to mind is the 
contamination of underground water, soil, visual intrusion and light. An additional filling station may 
significantly increase this risk and increase environmental stress. Mindful of this possibility, NEMA 
requires that the cumulative impact of a proposed development, together with the existing 
developments on the environment, socio-economic conditions and cultural heritage must be assessed. 
The cumulative effect of the proposed development must naturally be assessed in the light of existing 
developments. A consideration of socio-economic conditions therefore includes the consideration of 
the impact of the proposed development not only in combination with the existing developments, but 
also its impact on existing ones.  
[73] This approach to the scope of the obligation to consider socio-economic conditions is consistent 
with the concept of sustainable development under our legislation.  
…. 
[78] What must be stressed here is that the objective of considering the impact of a proposed 
development on existing ones is not to stamp out competition; it is to ensure the economic, social and 
environmental sustainability of all developments, both proposed and existing ones. Environmental 
concerns do not commence and end once the proposed development is approved. It is a continuing 
concern. The environmental legislation imposes a continuing, and thus necessarily evolving, 
obligation to ensure the sustainability of the development and to protect the environment. As the 
International Court of Justice observed—  
“in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required on account of 
the often irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the limitations inherent 
in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage.”  
[79] There are two points that must be stressed here. First, the Constitution, ECA and NEMA do not 
protect the existing developments at the expense of future developments. What section 24 requires, 
and what NEMA gives effect to, is that socio-economic development must be justifiable in the light of 
the need to protect the environment. The Constitution and environmental legislation introduce a new 
criterion for considering future developments. Pure economic factors are no longer decisive. The need 
for development must now be determined by its impact on the environment, sustainable development 
and social and economic interests. The duty of environmental authorities is to integrate these factors 
into decision-making and make decisions that are informed by these considerations. This process 
requires a decision-maker to consider the impact of the proposed development on the environment 
and socio-economic conditions.  
[80] Second, the objective of this exercise, as NEMA makes it plain, is both to identify and predict the 
actual or potential impact on socio-economic conditions and consider ways of minimising negative 
impact while maximising benefit. Were it to be otherwise, the earth would become a graveyard for 
commercially failed developments. And this in itself poses a potential threat to the environment. One 
of the environmental risks associated with filling stations is the impact of a proposed filling station on 
the feasibility of filling stations in close proximity. The assessment of such impact is necessary in 
order to minimise the harmful effect of the proliferation of filling stations on the environment. The 
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requirement to consider the impact of a proposed development on socio-economic conditions, 
including the impact on existing developments addresses this concern.  
[81] Finally NEMA requires “a risk averse and cautious approach” to be applied by decision-makers. 
This approach entails taking into account the limitation on present knowledge about the consequences 
of an environmental decision. This precautionary approach is especially important in the light of 
section 24(7)(b) of NEMA which requires the cumulative impact of a development on the 
environmental and socio-economic conditions to be investigated and addressed. An increase in the 
risk of contamination of underground water and soil, and visual intrusion and light, for example, are 
some of the significant cumulative impacts that could result from the proliferation of filling stations. 
Subsection 24(7)(b) specifically requires the investigation of the potential impact, including 
cumulative effects, of the proposed development on the environment and socio-economic conditions, 
and the assessment of the significance of that potential impact.30  
[82] What was required of the environmental authorities therefore was to consider the impact on the 
environment of the proliferation of filling stations as well as the impact of the proposed filling station 
on existing ones. This conclusion makes it plain that the obligation to consider the socio-economic 
impact of a proposed development is wider than the requirement to assess need and desirability under 
the Ordinance. It also comprehends the obligation to assess the cumulative impact on the environment 
of the proposed development.  
[83] What remains to be considered now is whether the environmental authorities complied with this 
obligation. 
Did the environmental authorities comply with their obligations under NEMA? 
[84] It is common cause that the environmental authorities themselves did not consider need and 
desirability. They took the view that these were matters that must be “proven, argued and considered 
by the Local Council” when an application for rezoning is made in terms of section 56 of the 
Ordinance.  
. . . 
[88] By their own admission therefore the environmental authorities did not consider need and 
desirability. Instead they relied upon the fact that (a) the property was rezoned for the construction of 
a filling station; (b) a motivation for need and desirability would have been submitted for the purposes 
of rezoning; and (c) the town-planning authorities must have considered the motivation prior to 
approving the rezoning scheme. Neither of environmental authorities claims to have seen the 
motivation, let alone read its contents. They left the consideration of this vital aspect of their 
environmental obligation entirely to the local authority. This in my view is manifestly not a proper 
discharge of their statutory duty. This approach to their obligations, in effect, amounts to unlawful 
delegation of their duties to the local authority. This they cannot do.  
. . . 
 [91] What must be stressed here is that the question on review is not whether there is evidence that an 
additional filling station posed undue threat to the environment. The question is whether the 
environmental authorities considered and evaluated the social and economic impact of the proposed 
filling station on existing ones and how an additional filling station would affect the environment. 
Indeed it is difficult to fathom how the environmental authorities could have assessed the threat of 
overtrading to the environment if they did not apply their minds to this question at all. They could 
have established such threats if they had applied their mind to this question. They did not do so. Their 
decision cannot therefore stand.  
                                                 
30 Section 24(7)(b) of NEMA provides:  
“Procedures for the investigation, assessment and communication of the potential impact of activities 
must, as a minimum, ensure … investigation of the potential impact, including cumulative effects, of 
the activity and its alternatives on the environment, socio-economic conditions and cultural heritage, 
and assessment of the significance of that potential impact”. 
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[92] It is no answer by the environmental authorities to say that had they themselves considered the 
need and desirability aspect, this could have led to conflicting decisions between the environmental 
officials and the town-planning officials. If that is the natural consequence of the discharge of their 
obligations under the environmental legislation, it is a consequence mandated by the statute. It is 
impermissible for them to seek to avoid this consequence by delegating their obligations to the town-
planning authorities. What is of grave concern here is that the environmental authorities did not even 
have sight of the motivation placed before the local authority relating to need and desirability, let 
alone read it. Section 24(1) of NEMA makes it clear that the potential impact on socio-economic 
conditions must be considered by “the organ of state charged by law with authorising, permitting or 
otherwise allowing the implementation of [a proposed] activity.”  
. . . 
[97] In any event, there is no suggestion that either the town-planning authorities, or the 
environmental authorities applied their minds to the impact of the proposed filling station on socio-
economic conditions. The scoping report was concerned primarily with the financial feasibility of the 
proposed filling station. In fact, it said nothing about the impact of the proposed filling station on the 
existing ones. In all the circumstances of this case, the environmental authorities took a narrow view 
of their obligations and misconstrued their obligations. As a consequence of this, the environmental 
authorities failed to apply their minds to the impact of the proposed filling station on socio-economic 
conditions.  
[98] Before concluding this judgment, there are two matters that should be mentioned in relation to 
the duty of environmental authorities which are a source of concern. The first relates to the attitude of 
Water Affairs and Forestry and the environmental authorities. The environmental authorities and 
Water Affairs and Forestry did not seem to take seriously the threat of contamination of underground 
water supply. The precautionary principle required these authorities to insist on adequate 
precautionary measures to safeguard against the contamination of underground water. This principle 
is applicable where, due to unavailable scientific knowledge, there is uncertainty as to the future 
impact of the proposed development. Water is a precious commodity; it is a natural resource that must 
be protected for the benefit of present and future generations.  
[99] In these circumstances one would have expected that the environmental authorities and Water 
Affairs and Forestry would conduct a thorough investigation into the possible impact of the 
installation of petrol tanks in the vicinity of the borehole, in particular, in the light of the existence of 
other filling stations in the vicinity. The environmental authorities did not consider the cumulative 
effect of the proliferation of filling stations on the aquifer. The Geohydrology division of Water 
Affairs and Forestry was content with simply stating that the developer must ensure that there is no 
pollution of water and that there must be monitoring as proposed in the report and in accordance with 
the regulations. Neither the Water Quality Management nor the Water Utilization divisions of the 
Water Affairs and Forestry commented on the reports as they did not receive them. They became 
aware of the development after both the record of decision and the appeal from it had been issued.  
[100] The other matter relates to the attitude of the environmental authorities to the objection of the 
applicant to the construction of the proposed filling station. In the Supreme Court of Appeal they 
argued that the applicant's opposition to the application for authorisation was motivated by the desire 
to stifle competition which was “thinly disguised as a desire to protect the environment”. In this 
regard, they pointed to the fact that the main deponent on behalf of the applicant, Mr Le Roux, owns 
other filling stations in the area. The Supreme Court of Appeal found that “there appears to be some 
merit in the contention.” Whatever, the merits of the criticism may be, a matter on which it is not 
necessary to express an opinion, an environmental authority whose duty it is to protect the 
environment should welcome every opportunity to consider and assess issues that may adversely 
affect the environment.  
[101] Similarly, the duty of a court of law when the decision of an environmental authority is brought 
on review is to evaluate the soundness or otherwise of the objections raised. In doing so, the court 
must apply the applicable legal principles. If upon a proper application of the legal principles, the 
objections are valid, the court has no option but to uphold the objections. That is the duty that is 
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imposed on a court by the Constitution, which is to uphold the Constitution and the law which they 
“… must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.” Neither the identity of the litigant 
who raises the objection nor the motive is relevant.  
[102] The role of the courts is especially important in the context of the protection of the environment 
and giving effect to the principle of sustainable development. The importance of the protection of the 
environment cannot be gainsaid. Its protection is vital to the enjoyment of the other rights contained in 
the Bill of Rights; indeed, it is vital to life itself. It must therefore be protected for the benefit of the 
present and future generations. The present generation holds the earth in trust for the next generation. 
This trusteeship position carries with it the responsibility to look after the environment. It is the duty 
of the court to ensure that this responsibility is carried out. Indeed, the Johannesburg Principles 
adopted at the Global Judges Symposium underscore the role of the judiciary in the protection of the 
environment.31  
[103] On that occasion members of the judiciary across the globe made the following statement—  
“We affirm our commitment to the pledge made by world leaders in the Millennium 
Declaration adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in September 2000 ‘to spare no 
effort to free all of humanity, and above all our children and grandchildren, from the threat of 
living on a planet irredeemably spoilt by human activities, and whose resources would no 
longer be sufficient for their needs’”.  
        In addition, they affirmed—  
“… that an independent Judiciary and judicial process is vital for the same implementation, 
development and enforcement of environmental law, and that members of the Judiciary, as 
well as those contributing to the judicial process at the national, regional and global levels, are 
crucial partners for promoting compliance with, and the implementation and the enforcement 
of, international and national environmental law”.  
[104] One of these principles expresses—  
“A full commitment to contributing towards the realization of the goals of sustainable 
development through the judicial mandate to implement, develop and enforce the law, and to 
uphold the Rule of Law and the democratic process … ”  
Courts therefore have a crucial role to play in the protection of the environment. When the need arises 
to intervene in order to protect the environment, they should not hesitate to do so.  
Conclusion 
[105] The considerations set out above make it clear that the decision of the environmental authorities 
is flawed and falls to be set aside as they misconstrued the obligations imposed on them by NEMA. In 
all the circumstances, the decision by the environmental authorities to grant authorisation for the 
construction of the filling station under section 22(1) of ECA cannot stand and falls to be reviewed 
and set aside. It follows that both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal erred, the High 
Court in dismissing the application for review and the Supreme Court of Appeal in upholding the 
decision of the High Court.  
The relief 
[106] The appropriate relief in this case is to send the matter back to the environmental authorities for 
them to consider the matter afresh in a manner that is consistent with this judgment.  
Costs 
                                                 
31  United Nations Environment Programme — Division of Policy Development and Law, Global Judges 
Symposium on Sustainable Development and the Role of Law — The Johannesburg Principles on the Role of 
Law and Sustainable Development adopted at the Global Judges Symposium held in Johannesburg, South 
Africa on 18–20 August 2002, http://www.unep.org/dpdl/symposium/Principles.htm, accessed on 4 June 2007.  
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[107] Then there is the question of costs. This is a case, in my view, in which the costs should follow 
the result. However, I do not think that the Trust and its trustees must be saddled with costs. It is true 
that they opposed the matter — but this was to safeguard their interests. The contest, at the end of the 
day, was between the applicant and the first, second and third respondents. It is these respondents who 
should pay the cost of the applicant while the remaining respondents who opposed the matter will 
have to look after their own costs. The costs payable by the first, second and third respondents must 
include those that are consequent upon the employment of two counsel.  
Moseneke DCJ, Madala J, Mokgoro J, Navsa AJ, Nkabinde J, O'Regan J, Skweyiya J, and Van der 
Westhuizen J concur in the judgment of Ngcobo J.  
Questions & Discussion 
1. In Argentina, the right is deemed a subjective right entitling any person to initiate an action for 
environmental protection.  Kattan, Alberto and Others v. National Government, Juzgado Nacional de 
la Instancia en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal.  No. 2, Ruling of 10 May 1983, La Ley, 1983-
D, 576; Irazu Margarita v. Copetro S.A. , Camara Civil y Comercial de la Plata, Ruling of 10 May 
1993 (available at www.eldial.com)(“The right to live in a healthy and balanced environment is a 
fundamental attribute of people.  Any aggression to the environment ends up becoming a threat to life 
itself and to the psychological and physical integrity of the person.”). See also Asociacion Para la 
Proteccion de Medio Ambiente y Educacion Ecologica ‘18 de Octubre’ v Aguas Argentinas S.A. & 
otros, Federal Appellate Tribunal of La Plata (2003); Kattan, Alberto and Others v. National 
Government, Juzgado Nacional de la Instancia en lo Contenciosoadministrativo Federal.  No. 2, 
Ruling of 10 May 1983, La Ley, 1983-D, 576.  Colombia also recognizes the enforceability of the 
right to environment.  Fundepublico v. Mayor of Bugalagrande and Others, Juzgado Primero superior, 
Interlocutorio # 032, Tulua, 19 Dec. 1991 (“It should be recognized that a healthy environment is a 
sina qua non condition for life itself and that no right could be exercised in a deeply altered 
environment.”).  For Chilean cases see Pablo Orrego Silva y Otros v. Empresa Electrica Pange SA 
(Supreme Court, Aug. 5, 1993); Antonio Horvath Kiss y Otros v. National Commission for the 
Environment (Supreme Court, March 19, 1997).  
 
2. Is it necessary or useful to include the right to a safe and healthy environment among human rights 
guarantees?  Or is this simply “devaluing the currency” by unnecessarily adding desires and claims to 
the catalogue of accepted guarantees?  The UN General Assembly set forth criteria for adding to the 
network of international human rights standards in resolution 41/120 (Dec. 4, 1986).  The resolution 
recognized the value of continuing efforts to identify specific areas where further international action 
is required to develop the existing international legal framework, adding that standard-setting should 
be effective and efficient and in accord with the following guidelines: 
a. Be consistent with existing body of international human rights law; 
b. Be of fundamental character and derive from the inherent dignity and worth of the 
human person; 
c. Be sufficiently precise to give rise to identifiable and practicable rights and 
obligations; 
d. Provide, were appropriate, realistic and effective implementation machinery, 
including reporting systems; 
e. Attract broad international support. 
Do these guidelines support the further development of the right to a safe and healthy environment? 
 
3. From the above readings, does it seem that the right to environment is widely accepted as a 
justiciable right?  What does it contribute to human rights or to environmental protection? 
 
4. For further reading: Gudmundur Alfredson and Alexandre Ovsiouk, “Human Rights and the 
Environment,” 60 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 19 (1991); L. Collins, “Are We there Yet? The Right to 
Environment in International and European Law,” 2007 MCGILL INT’L J. OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT L & POL’Y 119; Philippe Cullet, “Definition of an Environmental Right in a Human 
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Rights Context,” 13 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 25 (1995); Maguelonne Dejeant-Pons, “The Right to 
Environment in Regional Human Rights Systems,” in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 595 (Paul Mahoney & Kathleen Mahoney eds., 1993); Maguelonne Dejeant-Pons and Marc 
Pallemaerts, DROITS DE L'HOMME ET ENVIRONNEMENT (2002). Richard Desgagne, “Integrating 
Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human Rights,” 89 AM. J. INT'L L.263 
(1995); Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Right of the Child to a Clean Environment, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 611 
(1999); Gunther Handl, “Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly 'Revisionist' 
View,” in HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Antonio A. Cancado Trindade ed., 
1992); HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Alan Boyle & Michael 
Anderson eds., 1996); Michael J. Kane, “Promoting Political Rights to Protect the Environment,” 18 
YALE J. INT'L L. 389. Alexandre Kiss, Le Droit  la Conservation de l'environnement,  1 REV. 
UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 445 (1990) ; John Lee, The Underlying Legal Theory to 
Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary 
International Law, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.. 283, 308-09 (2000); James T. McClymonds, The Human 
Right to a Healthy Environment: An International Legal Perspective, 37 N.Y.L.S. L.REV. 583 (1992); 
Karen E. MacDonald, Sustaining the Environmental Rights of Children: An Exploratory Critique, 18 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 39 (2006); Ole Pedersen, European Environmental Human Rights and 
Environmental Rights: A Long Time Coming? 21 GEO. INT’L ENVT’L L. REV. (2008); Neil Popovic, 
“In Pursuit of Environmental Human Rights: Commentary on the Draft Declaration of Principles on 
Human Rights and the Environment,” 27 COL. HUM. RTS. REV. 487 (1996); Dinah Shelton, What 
Happened in Rio to Human Rights? 4 Y.B.INT'L ENVTL. L. 75 (1994); Dinah Shelton, “Environmental 
Rights,” in PEOPLES RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2001);  Melissa Thorme, “Establishing Environment 
as a Human Right,” 19 DEN J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 302 (1991); Jon van Dyke, “A Proposal to Introduce 
the Right to a Healthy Environment into the European Convention Regime,”13 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 323 
(1993). 
 
 
III. A Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Environment? 
 
In 1994, Fatma Zohra Ksentini, Special Rapporteur of the former Sub-Commission on the 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (later called the Sub-Commission 
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights), released a Final Report (“Ksentini 
Report”) examining the relationship between human rights and the environment, excerpted 
below.  One of the most striking conclusions of the Ksentini Report is that there has been a 
“shift from environmental law to the right to a healthy environment” and that this right is part 
of existing international law and capable of immediate implementation by existing human 
rights bodies.  The Report elaborates that the right is comprised of a number of elements 
including the right to life, health, development, public participation, and access to 
information and judicial remedies.  The report contains an Appendix setting out a Draft 
Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and Environment intended to explicitly elaborate 
the right to environment and its substantive and procedural components.  Consider whether 
the Draft Declaration is akin to the Universal Declaration.  Does it possess the potential for 
pushing human rights and the environment forward? 
 
DRAFT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Fatma Zohra Ksentini, Special Rapporteur 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (1994), Annex 
 
. . . Reaffirming the universality, indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights,  
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Recognizing that sustainable development links the right to development and the right to a 
secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment,  
Recalling the right of peoples to self-determination by virtue of which they have the right 
freely to determine their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development,  
Deeply concerned by the severe human rights consequences of environmental harm 
caused by poverty, structural adjustment and debt programmes and by international trade and 
intellectual property regimes,  
Convinced that the potential irreversibility of environmental harm gives rise to special 
responsibility to prevent such harm,  
Concerned that human rights violations lead to environmental degradation and that 
environmental degradation leads to human rights violations,  
The following Principles are declared:  
 
Part I 
 
1. Human rights, an ecologically sound environment, sustainable development and peace 
are interdependent and indivisible.  
2. All persons have the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment. 
This right and other human rights, including civil, cultural, economic, political and social 
rights, are universal, interdependent and indivisible.  
3. All persons shall be free from any form of discrimination in regard to actions and 
decisions that affect the environment.  
4. All persons have the right to an environment adequate to meet equitably the needs of 
present generations and that does not impair the rights of future generations to meet equitably 
their needs.  
 
Part II 
 
5. All persons have the right to freedom from pollution, environmental degradation and 
activities that adversely affect the environment, threaten life, health, livelihood, well-being or 
sustainable development within, across or outside national boundaries.  
6. All persons have the right to protection and preservation of the air, soil, water, sea-ice, 
flora and fauna, and the essential processes and areas necessary to maintain biological 
diversity and ecosystems.  
7. All persons have the right to the highest attainable standard of health free from 
environmental  
8. All persons have the right to safe and healthy food and water adequate to their well-
being.  
9. All persons have the right to a safe and healthy working environment.  
10. All persons have the right to adequate housing, land tenure and living conditions in a 
secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment.  
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11 . All persons have the right not to be evicted from their homes or land for the purpose 
of, or as a consequence of, decisions or actions affecting the environment, except in 
emergencies or due to a compelling purpose benefiting society as a whole and not attainable 
by other means. All persons have the right to participate effectively in decisions and to 
negotiate concerning their eviction and the right, if evicted, to timely and adequate restitution, 
compensation and/or appropriate and sufficient accommodation or land.  
12. All persons have the right to timely assistance in the event of natural or technological 
or other human-caused catastrophes.  
13. Everyone has the right to benefit equitably from the conservation and sustainable use 
of nature and natural resources for cultural, ecological, educational, health, livelihood, 
recreational, spiritual or other purposes. This Includes ecologically sound access to nature. 
Everyone has the right to preservation of unique sites, consistent with the fundamental rights 
of persons or groups living in the area.  
14. Indigenous peoples have the right to control their lands, territories and natural 
resources and to maintain their traditional way of life. This includes the right to security in 
the enjoyment of their means of subsistence.  Indigenous peoples have the right to protection 
against any action or course of conduct that may result in the destruction or degradation of 
their territories, including land, air, water, sea-ice, wildlife or other resources.  
 
Part III 
 
15. All persons have the right to information concerning the environment. This includes 
information, howsoever compiled, on actions and courses of conduct that may affect the 
environment and information necessary to enable effective public participation in 
environmental decision-making. The information shall be timely, clear, understandable and 
available without undue financial burden to the applicant.  
16. All persons have the right to hold and express opinions and to disseminate ideas and 
information regarding the environment.  
17. All persons have the right to environmental and human rights education.  
18. All persons have the right to active, free, and meaningful participation in planning and 
decision-making activities and processes that may have an impact on the environment and 
development. This includes the right to a prior assessment of the environmental, 
developmental and human rights consequences of proposed actions.  
19. All persons have the right to associate freely and peacefully with others for purposes 
of protecting the environment or the rights of persons affected by environmental harm.  
20. All persons have the right to effective remedies and redress in administrative or 
judicial proceedings for environmental harm or the threat of such harm.  
Part IV 
 
21. All persons, individually and in association with others, have a duty to protect and 
preserve the environment.  
22. All States shall respect and ensure the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically 
sound environment. Accordingly, they shall adopt the administrative, legislative and other 
measures necessary to effectively implement the rights in this Declaration.  These measures 
shall aim at the prevention of environmental harm, at the provision of adequate remedies, and 
at the sustainable use of natural resources and shall include, inter alia,  
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* collection and dissemination of information concerning the environment  
* prior assessment and control, licensing, regulation or prohibition of activities and 
substances potentially harmful to the environment;  
* public participation in environmental decision-making;  
* effective administrative and judicial remedies and redress for environmental harm and 
the threat of such harm;  
* monitoring, management and equitable sharing of natural resources;  
* measures to reduce wasteful processes of production and patterns of consumption;  
* measures aimed at ensuring that transnational corporations, wherever they operate, 
carry out their duties of environmental protection, sustainable development and respect for 
human rights; and  
* measures aimed at ensuring that the international organizations and agencies to which 
they belong observe the rights and duties in this Declaration. 
23. States and all other parties shall avoid using the environment as a means of war or 
inflicting significant, long-term or widespread harm on the environment, and shall respect 
international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and 
cooperate in its further development.  
24. All international organizations and agencies shall observe the rights and duties in this 
Declaration.  
 
Part V 
 
25. In implementing the rights and duties in this Declaration, special attention shall be 
given to vulnerable persons and groups.  
26. The rights in this Declaration may be subject only to restrictions provided by law and 
which are necessary to protect public order, health and the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of others.  
27. All persons are entitled to a social and international order in which the rights in this 
Declaration can be fully realized. 
Questions and Discussion 
 
Benefits of the Declaration of Principles.  Given that the Draft Declaration of Principles 
has not been codified into a binding treaty (and is not likely to be so in the foreseeable 
future), are there any benefits to the Declaration?  Neil Popoviü, then a lawyer with Sierra 
Club Legal Defense Fund (now Earthrights), took part in an experts meeting immediately 
prior to the completion of the Ksentini report.  The meeting drafted a document that became 
the Draft Declaration of Principles above.  Popoviü comments: 
 
. . . The Draft Declaration reflects a progression from earlier discussions of a 
“right to environment” to consideration of the manner in which recognized human 
rights apply to environmental issues. The Draft Declaration is neither the last word 
nor necessarily the best word on any particular aspect of environmental human rights, 
but it is the most prominent international instrument in the standard-setting process 
for environmental human rights. . . . 
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Neither environmental human rights in general nor the Draft Declaration in 
particular will save the world. Indeed, recognition of the environmental dimension of 
human rights does not create new obligations for states or for others. It does call for 
reassessment of existing obligations, however.  Environmental human rights and the 
Draft Declaration provide a framework for addressing domestic and international 
environmental problems. They both have the potential to advance protection of human 
rights and the environment. . . . 
The value of environmental human rights and the Draft Declaration does not, 
however, rest exclusively on their legal foundation. Human rights affect official and 
private conduct in part because of the substantial moral weight they carry. 
Recognition of social values as “human rights,” at least where the recognition reflects 
genuine and well-considered judgment in a democratic society, erects a moral barrier 
to the contravention of those values. Even in non-democratic countries . . . 
governments claim to respect human rights. 
The Draft Declaration . . . should provide support for advocates of human rights 
and environmental protection in legal and other forums. Exposition of the legal 
underpinnings of the principles in the Draft Declaration should bolster their 
acceptance and their incorporation into legal regimes. The Draft Declaration can serve 
as a reference point for national and international systems and as a vehicle for 
development of a formal, binding international legal instrument that protects 
environmental human rights. 
The Draft Declaration can also serve as a focal point for discussion of 
environmental human rights and for the development of institutions and procedures to 
enhance protection of these rights. As consideration of environmental human rights 
principles progresses and as the principles mature, they should provide an increasing 
sense of empowerment for the victims of environmental human rights abuses and a 
corresponding sense of restraint for offending governments, individuals, international 
organizations, and commercial enterprises. 
 
Neil Popoviü, In Pursuit of Environmental Human Rights: Commentary on the Draft 
Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and Environment, 27 Colum. Human Rts L. Rev. 
487, 493-97 (1996).   
 
 
